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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough'
and Elinor H. Hitt"
This survey period' saw continued evolution of domestic relations
law.2 Legislation passed during the 2010 and 2011 Regular Session of
the Georgia General Assembly took effect during this survey period, and
the Georgia Supreme Court continued to accept nonfrivolous appeals in
divorce cases, which provide guidance to those interested in domestic
relations law.
I.

PATERNITY AND LEGITIMATION

In Venable v. Parker,' a final paternity judgment was challenged.
Parker executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and a final
order establishing paternity and child support was entered. Several
months later, Parker filed a motion to set aside the final order on the
grounds of fraud and mistake. The trial court found that Parker did
not meet the statutory requirements for disestablishing paternity under
section 19-7-54 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),

* Partner in the firm of Warner, Mayoue, Bates & McGough, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of California at Berkley (A.B., 1963; LL.B., 1966). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Warner, Mayoue, Bates & McGough, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993; M.S.W., 1996); Georgia State University College of
Law (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. This Survey chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 2010 to May 31, 2011.
2. For an analysis of Georgia domestic relations law during the prior survey period, see
Barry B. McGough & Elinor H. Hitt, Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
62 MERCER L. REV. 105 (2010).
3. 307 Ga. App. 880, 706 S.E.2d 211 (2011).
4. Id.
5. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-54 (2010).
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and Parker's motion was denied.6 However, the parties were ordered
to undergo genetic testing to establish paternity of the child.
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that, because Parker's motion to set
aside the final order was denied, the trial court lacked authority to order
genetic testing.' Until the paternity order is reversed, genetic testing
cannot be ordered.9 Judge Dillard filed a concurring opinion and
identified that a final paternity judgment may be challenged by either
"a motion to set aside paternity pursuant to [O.C.G.A.1 § 19-7-54 [or by]
an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence.""o
The court of appeals also addressed issues related to legitimation
actions. In Baker v. Lankford," Mark Baker moved to intervene in a
legitimation action filed by Robert Lankford regarding a child, K.B., who
Kristen Baker (Ms. Baker) gave birth to in December 2006 while
married to Mark Baker (Mr. Baker). In June 2008, Ms. Baker told Mr.
Baker that K.B. was Lankford's biological child. In February 2009, Mr.
Baker filed for divorce. Before the divorce was finalized, Lankford filed
a petition to legitimate K.B., and Kristen Baker consented to the
legitmation. DNA tests showed a 99.997% likelihood that Lankford was
the father. Mr. Baker moved to intervene and dismiss the legitimation
proceeding. However, while the petition to intervene was pending,
Lankford's legitimation petition was granted. Mr. Baker's motion to
intervene was later denied, and his motion to dismiss was found to be
moot.12
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in denying Mr.
Baker's motion to intervene." The requirements to intervene in an
action are three-fold: "[(1)1 interest, [(2)] impairment resulting from an
unfavorable disposition, and [(3)] inadequate representation [by existing
parties]."" Mr. Baker was K.B.'s legal father and had parental and
custodial rights to the child; thus, he clearly had an interest in the
legitimation proceeding." The court held that Mr. Baker could also

6.
7.

Venable, 307 Ga. App. at 882-83, 706 S.E.2d at 213.
Id. at 883, 706 S.E.2d at 213.

8.
9.

Id.
Id.

10. Id. at 884 n.4, 706 S.E.2d at 214 n.4 (Dillard, J., concurring).
11. 306 Ga. App. 327, 702 S.E.2d 666 (2010).
12. Id. at 327-28, 702 S.E.2d at 667.
13. Id. at 328, 702 S.E.2d at 667.
14. Id. at 329, 702 S.E.2d at 668 (quoting Kubler v. Goerg, 197 Ga. App. 667, 668, 399
S.E.2d 229, 230 (1990)); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-54(aX2) (2006).
15. Baker, 306 Ga. App. at 329, 702 S.E.2d at 668 (quoting In re White, 254 Ga. 678,
679, 333 S.E.2d 588, 589 (1985)); see also O.C.G.A. § 19-7-20 (2010).
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suffer impairment from an unfavorable disposition because if, in an
unappealed order, K.B. was declared to be the legitimate child of
someone other than Mr. Baker, that man would take Mr Baker's place
Further, given the fact that Ms. Baker
as K.B.'s legal father."
consented to the legitimation, neither she nor Lankford could adequately
represent Mr. Baker's interests." Therefore, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's denial of Mr. Baker's motion to intervene.' 8
The court of appeals addressed the question of when a father's
opportunity interest begins in the case of In re VB.L.' 9 Ten years after
Lucius Christian had a brief encounter with Brandy Smith, he found out
he fathered a child with her. The maternal grandmother, Donna Smith,
sought to adopt the child (V.B.L.), who had been in her custody for six
years. After Christian learned of his child, he filed a motion to intervene
in the adoption and to determine the paternity of V.B.L. Once DNA
testing confirmed the child was his, Christian sought to legitimate. The
juvenile court granted Christian's legitimation petition after finding he
had not abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship
with V.B.L., but the court refused to consider Christian's actions during
the ten-year period before he learned he was the child's father.20
The court of appeals determined that Christian's opportunity interest
began when he had unprotected sex. 2 ' Thus, the juvenile court should
have considered Christian's actions not only "since he learned of his
parentage, but also since the time that he engaged in a nonmarital
sexual relationship with [the child's mother] in 1999.",22
II.

CHILD CUSTODY

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals and the
Georgia General Assembly both addressed issues related to child
custody. In Price v. Wingo,23 the maternal grandparents, the Wingos,
were awarded custody of their two-year-old grandson following his
parents 2008 divorce. Ten months later, the father filed an action to
modify custody, which the trial court denied. 24 The court of appeals
began its opinion by acknowledging that

16. Baker, 306 Ga. App. at 330, 702 S.E.2d at 668.
17. Id. at 330, 702 S.E.2d at 668-69.
18. Id. at 330, 702 S.E.2d at 669.
19.

306 Ga. App. 709, 709, 703 S.E.2d 127, 128 (2010).

20. Id. at 710-11, 703 S.E.2d at 128-29.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id. at 713, 703 S.E.2d at 130.
Id.
306 Ga. App. 283, 701 S.E.2d 904 (2010).
Id. at 283, 701 S.E.2d at 905.
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[olnce a third party has been awarded permanent custody of a child in
a court proceeding to which a parent was a party,... the third party
[then] has the prima facie right to custody as against the parent who
has lost the right to custody. The parent can regain custody upon
showing by clear and convincing evidence his or her present fitness as
a parent and that it is in the best interest of the child that custody be
changed.'
Here, the trial court found that the father established his present fitness
as a parent but that he failed to show the change in custody was in the
child's best interest.26 The trial court noted the father's short remarriage as the primary change in circumstance.27
The father asserted that the trial court erred in considering evidence
relating to matters that took place before the 2008 custody
award-namely, testimony about the father's two prior short marriages.
The court of appeals agreed that in determining the father's present
fitness, evidence as to unfitness must be confined to matters transpiring
after the divorce.2 ' However, "[iun determining the best interests of the
child, the judge may consider any relevant factor[,]" which includes past
performance of parenting responsibilities.' Thus, the trial court was
allowed to consider the short duration of the father's two previous
marriages and find that, because of the father's remarriage, the father
did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests
of the child required a change in custody.ao
During this survey period, two cases were reviewed that involved
grandparents bringing original actions for visitation rights with their
grandchildren. In Lightfoot v. Hollins,31 the child at issue was born in
2002. Following the parents' 2004 divorce, the mother was awarded
primary custody, but she died a few months later. Following her death,
the father obtained primary custody and limited the Hollins's, the
maternal grandparents, access to the child. The father remarried in
September 2006, and his wife adopted the child in April 2007.32

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
marks
30.
31.
32.

Id. (quoting Durden v. Barron, 249 Ga. 686, 687, 290 S.E.2d 923, 924 (1982)).
Id. at 283-84, 701 S.E.2d at 905.
Id.
Id. at 284, 701 S.E.2d at 905.
Id. at 284, 701 S.E.2d at 905-06 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation
omitted); O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(aX3) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
Price, 306 Ga. App. at 284, 701 S.E.2d at 906.
308 Ga. App. 538, 707 S.E.2d 491 (2011).
Id. at 538, 707 S.E.2d at 491-92.
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In November 2009, the Hollins filed an action for visitation pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3,3" alleging that the father only allowed them to see
the child twice since the mother's death.' The father filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the Hollins's rights had been
extinguished when the stepmother adopted the child. Moreover, the
father argued, the maternal grandparents failed to provide clear and
convincing evidence that the child's health or welfare would be harmed
if visitation was not permitted and that it was in the child's best interest
for visitation to be granted."
The Hollins asked the court to appoint a guardian ad litem and
claimed discovery needed to be done so they could meet their evidentiary
burden." "[Tihe trial court held that [O.C.G.A.] § 19-7-3 provide[d] a
basis for the grandparents' claim despite any alleged adoption, a
determination that [the father] does not contest."3 ' Thus, the court
denied the father's motion and appointed a guardian ad litem."'
The court of appeals affirmed and held that, under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3
and O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19,39 a grandparent's rights are not affected by
stepparent adoption.40 Furthermore, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-1156(f), even if the respondent cannot present facts in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment, the trial judge has discretion to either
deny the motion, allow the case to go forward, allow further discovery,
or take other action.42
The following month, the court of appeals reviewed another grandparent visitation case, with a seemingly different result. In Bailey v.
Kunz,43 the mother and father divorced in 2002 while the mother was
In 2006, the mother remarried, the biological father
pregnant.
surrendered his parental rights, and the mother's current husband
adopted the child. After the parties disagreed about visitation, the
biological father's parents filed a petition for visitation with the minor
child. The mother and adoptive father filed a motion to dismiss, which
the trial court denied."

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (2010).
Lightfoot, 308 Ga. App. at 538-39, 707 S.E.2d at 492.
Id. at 539, 707 S.E.2d at 492; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c).
Lightfoot, 308 Ga. App. at 539, 707 S.E.2d at 492; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(dxl).
Lightfoot, 308 Ga. App. at 539, 707 S.E.2d at 492.
Id. at 539-40, 707 S.E.2d at 492.
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19 (2010).
Lightfoot, 308 Ga. App. at 540, 707 S.E.2d at 493.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(f) (2006).
Lightfoot, 308 Ga. App. at 541-42, 707 S.E.2d at 493-94; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(f).
307 Ga. App. 710, 706 S.E.2d 98 (2011).
Id. at 711, 706 S.E.2d at 99.
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Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), a grandparent does not have the
right to file an original action for visitation rights "where the parents of
the minor child are not separated and the child is living with both of the
parents."4 On appeal, the mother and the stepfather argued that the
trial court erred by not treating the stepfather as a parent for purposes
of the statute.
Although the word "parent" is undefined in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), the
adoption statute, 7 specifically O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1,48 defines the word
parent to include the "legal father" of a child. 49 The court of appeals
held that the adoptive father was now the parent within the meaning of
the statute, and, thus, the biological father's parents had no standing to
file petition."o
In Roberts v. Kinsey," the father took issue with the parties' final
divorce decree, which provided that he and his former wife would share
legal and physical custody of their five-year-old son, the child would be
enrolled in the Henry County school district, and "[alny change or
relocation by husband should be agreed upon by the parties, and if not,
[it] will be circumstance to trigger reevaluation of custody by court.""
Soon after the divorce was final, the father took the child to Maryland
and refused to return him to Georgia. The mother filed numerous
actions, including a petition for a change of custody, contending that the
father absconded with the child, and that refusing to enroll him in
Henry County schools created a substantial change in circumstances
necessary for a change of custody. The mother was awarded sole legal
and physical custody of the minor child.
On appeal, the father argued that the lower court erroneously relied
on a "facially invalid self-executing custody provision" in the divorce
decree-if the father moved out of state without the mother's agreement,
custody would be reevaluated. The court of appeals disagreed, finding

45. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b).
46. Bailey, 307 Ga. App. at 711, 706 S.E.2d at 99.
47. O.C.G.A. tit. 19, ch. 8 (2010 & Supp. 2011).
48. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1(6), (8) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
49. Bailey, 307 Ga. App. at 712, 706 S.E.2d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted);
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1(6), (8).
50. Bailey, 307 Ga. App. at 713, 706 S.E.2d at 100-01.
51. 308 Ga. App. 675, 708 S.E.2d 600 (2011).
52. Id. at 675, 708 S.E.2d at 601.
53. Id. at 675-77, 708 S.E.2d at 601-02.
54. Id. at 677-78, 708 S.E.2d at 602-03; see also Scott v. Scott, 276 Ga. 372, 375, 578
S.E.2d at 876, 879-80 (2003) (holding "self-executing change of custody provisions . .. that
fail[] to give paramount import to the child's best interests in a change of custody as
between parents violates . . . public policy. . . .").
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the language in the decree did not create a self-executing custody
provision but provided for reevaluation of custody and the best interests
of the child by the court in the event the father moved out of Henry
County.ss
In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly passed the Military Parents
Rights Act," which became effective May 11, 2011.57 The Act provides protection in child custody disputes to members of the armed
forces, especially as it relates to a military parent's deployment.58
III. CHILD SUPPORT
Numerous cases were reviewed involving child support. The first
three cases clarified provisions of the revised child support guidelines
found in O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15.'9 In Holloway v. Holloway," the Georgia
Supreme Court held that, even where there is a nominal $18 difference
between the amount of child support owed using the child support
guidelines and the amount set forth in the parties' final decree, findings
of fact are mandatory regarding reasons for the deviation, amount of
child support required if there was no deviation, how the presumptive
amount of child support would be unjust or inappropriate, and how the
best interest of the child for whom support is being determined is served
by the deviation." The order, which did not include these findings, was
reversed.6 2
In Willis v. Willis, 5 the supreme court held the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it did not allow a parenting time deviation for
a shared custody arrangement and ordered the father to pay $961 per
month in child support.64 The trial court considered each party's
income and payments made by each party on behalf of the child and
specifically found it would not be in the best interest of the child for the
husband to be allowed a downward deviation of child support."

55. Roberts, 308 Ga. App. at 677-78, 708 S.E.2d at 602.
56. Ga. S. Bill 112, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 274 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-1, -3, 6 (Supp. 2011)).
57. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-1, -3, -6 (Supp. 2011).
58. Id.
59. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (Supp. 2011).
60. 288 Ga. 147, 702 S.E.2d 132 (2010).
61. Id. at 149, 702 S.E.2d at 134; O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(cX2)(E).
62. Holloway, 288 Ga. at 149, 702 S.E.2d at 134.
63. 288 Ga. 577, 707 S.E.2d 344 (2011).
64. Id. at 577-79, 707 S.E.2d at 346.
65. Id. at 578-79, 707 S.E.2d at 346; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15.
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Finally, in Stowell v. Huguenard," the trial court erred when it set
the father's monthly child support obligation based on his gross salary,
then ordered an annual payment of 25% of any gross commissions or
other irregular income the father received above his base salary." The
supreme court determined that requiring this annual payment as
additional child support amounted to a deviation from the presumptive
amount without any findings of fact to support the deviation as required
by statute.6 8
In Herrin v. Herrin," the evidence required to base a child support
award on a party's earning capacity was addressed by the supreme
court.o Per a 2005 child support order, the mother was ordered to pay
$300 in child support beginning January 15, 2007. The mother had
obtained her real estate license, and the trial court determined she was
able to earn $2,064 per month. In 2006 and part of 2007, the mother
earned $3,100 per month, but by late 2007, the mother was not
employed by the same company.7 1
In April 2008, the father filed petitions to modify child support and for
contempt. At a hearing, the trial court found the following: (1) the
mother was employed by a dental group earning $13 per hour working
four days a week, (2) she was underemployed, (3) she had given birth to
an illegitimate child but had not sought child support in an effort not to
lose the downward adjustment on her child support obligation, and (4)
she did not have certain living expenses because she lived in her
parents' basement. The trial court issued an order finding the mother
in contempt, finding her income had increased, and ordered her to pay
$975.74 in monthly child support and $2,500 of the father's attorney
fees.72
In reversing the trial court's judgment, the supreme court determined
that, by the time of the 2008 hearing, "the mother's income and earning
capacity had [actually] decreased from what was noted and projected in
the 2005 order and what actually occurred in 2006 and 2007.""7 Most
of the mother's salary paid her infant's day care bills; her hours at the
dental office could not be increased; and she was unable to pursue a real
estate career due to the depressed real estate market and her inability

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

288 Ga. 628, 706 S.E.2d 419 (2011).
Id. at 632, 706 S.E.2d at 423.
Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(bX8).
287 Ga. 427, 696 S.E.2d 626 (2010).
Id. at 427, 696 S.E.2d at 627.
Id. at 427-28, 696 S.E.2d at 627.
Id. at 428, 696 S.E.2d at 627-28.
Id. at 429, 696 S.E.2d at 628.
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to fund out-of-pocket costs. The mother had limited education and no
specialized training or marketable skill other than her real estate license
and training in dental assisting.14
There was no evidence that the mother had means to acquire future
education or training, that she was able to earn in excess of her salary,
that she was willfully underemployed, or that she was suppressing her
income." The supreme court held that "to sustain an award of child
support premised upon earning capacity, there must be evidence that the
parent then has the ability to earn an amount sufficient to pay the
award of support . . . .""
In Mullin v. Roy," the supreme court considered whether a trial
court has the authority to order a lump-sum child support award"
During the divorce proceedings, the husband pled guilty to child
pornography charges and was sentenced to time in prison. At the time
of the divorce trial, the husband was living off a $422,000 inheritance.
After acknowledging that, as a registered sex offender, the husband's
future earning ability would be impaired, the trial court ordered the
husband to pay his total child support obligation in a single lump-sum
payment.
On appeal, the supreme court determined that nothing in O.C.G.A.
§ 19-6-15 precluded a lump-sum award.'o In fact, "the statute ...
explicitly authorizes trial courts to exercise discretion in setting the
manner and timing of payment," and requires trial courts to "'[sipecify
.

.

. in what manner, how often, to whom, and until when the support

shall be paid.'""
82 the child support guidelines
In Smith v. Carter,
were applied to
actions for actual expenses incurred prior to an initial child support
award." The parties' son was born in 1994. After the couple separated
in 1997, the mother retained custody of the child. Over the next twelve
years, the father contributed only $100 towards his support. At the
same time, the father married and adopted five children. In 2009, the
mother sued for past and future child support. The trial court found the
father's monthly income to be $2,222.80 and the mother's to be $6,384.20

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 429, 696 S.E.2d at 628-29.
Id. at 428-29, 696 S.E.2d at 628.
287 Ga. 810, 700 S.E.2d 370 (2010).
Id. at 810, 700 S.E.2d at 371.
Id.
Id. at 811, 700 S.E.2d at 372.
Id. (alteration in original); O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)(2)(B).
305 Ga. App. 479, 699 S.E.2d 796 (2010).
Id. at 482, 699 S.E.2d at 798.
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and ordered the father to pay future child support of $115 per month.
The trial court also found that the mother spent $83,600 to care for the
child during the previous twelve years. After crediting the father for
parenting time, the court ordered him to pay the mother $70,224 in back
child support."
The court of appeals vacated the back award of child support because
the trial court failed to consider O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15."
The child
support guidelines must be considered in setting child support and "shall
apply as a rebuttable presumption in all legal proceedings involving the
child support responsibilityof a parent."" Both parties' income and the
father's other support responsibilities should have been considered in
determining what portion of the actual expenses must be borne by the
father."'
In Simmons v. Simmons,88 the supreme court affirmed that a trial
court can order a parent who is obligated to pay child support to obtain
a life insurance policy, disapproving Mongerson v. Mongerson," to the
extent it could be read otherwise.o
IV.

EVIDENCE FROM TEMPORARY HEARING

Both the court of appeals and the supreme court reviewed cases that
addressed the use of evidence from a temporary hearing at a final
hearing. In Carroll v. Carroll," the court of appeals found no error but
confirmed that, at a final hearing, the trial court was required to rule on
the evidence presented at that final hearing and not on knowledge
gleaned from affidavits submitted in anticipation of a temporary
hearing.92
In Pace v. Pace," the supreme court found error when, at a final
hearing, the trial court relied substantially on testimony adduced at the
temporary hearing without putting the parties on notice that such
testimony would be considered."

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 479-80, 699 S.E.2d at 797.
Id. at 481, 699 S.E.2d at 798.
Id. (emphasis added); O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)(1).
Carter, 305 Ga. App. at 482, 699 S.E.2d at 798.
288 Ga. 670, 706 S.E.2d 456 (2011).
285 Ga. 554, 678 S.E.2d 891 (2009).
Simmons, 288 Ga. at 672 & n.4, 706 S.E.2d at 460 & n.4.
307 Ga. App. 143, 704 S.E.2d 450 (2011).
Id. at 144, 704 S.E.2d at 451.
287 Ga. 899, 700 S.E.2d 571 (2010).
Id. at 901, 700 S.E.2d at 573.

2011]1

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

147

V. TRANSMUTATION OF SEPARATE PROPERTY INTO MARITAL PROPERTY
In Miller v. Miller," the supreme court addressed the transmutation
of separate property into marital property." The trial court entered a
divorce decree that found the parties' marital residence and a lot on
Amelia Island to be marital property.97 On appeal, the husband argued
the trial court erred in failing to find that "the source of funds used for
acquiring the marital residence and the Amelia Island lot was his
He maintained that both properties were
separate property.""
from a prior residence, which was purchased
proceeds
with
purchased
with premarital funds prior to marriage. However, after the marriage,
the prior residence was deeded into both parties' names, which the wife
testified was to reflect her contributions to the household.99
Evidence also showed that both parties sold the prior residence, the
proceeds were deposited into the parties' joint account (and thus
commingled with the funds therein), and the husband conveyed the
marital residence to both parties the day it was purchased."co Thus,
the supreme court held that the trial court was authorized to find that
the prior residence had been transformed into marital property.'o'
VI.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

In Miller v. Miller,102 the supreme court also addressed valuing a
professional practice."0 ' The trial court accepted the $331,214 value
placed on the husband's medical practice by the wife's expert, who used
a combination of the asset approach, market approach, and income
approach. The husband challenged the trial court's valuation of his
business.'

In affirming the trial court, the supreme court held there is no one
best way to value a professional practice-multiple methods may be used,
and experts weigh each approach differently based on the specific
business at issue.10 ' The facts upon which an expert bases their

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

288 Ga. 274, 705 S.E.2d 839 (2010).
Id. at 279-80, 705 S.E.2d at 845.
Id. at 274, 705 S.E.2d at 841.
Id. at 279-80, 705 S.E.2d at 845 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 280, 705 S.E.2d at 845.
Id.
Id.
288 Ga. 274, 705 S.E.2d 839 (2010).
Id. at 274, 705 S.E.2d at 841.
Id. at 274, 705 S.E.2d at 841-42.
Id. at 275-76, 705 S.E.2d at 842.
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opinion are admissible.o' The fact finder then determines the weight
given to the valuation techniques used by an expert."'o
Regarding two issues of first impression in Miller, the trial court
found, and the supreme court affirmed, that (1) the use of all of the
husband's income, including both his salary and business income from
his medical practice, when determining his gross income for childsupport purposes, does not constitute "double-dipping,"'o and (2) the
professional practice's enterprise goodwill is included in the value of a
practice. 0 9
VII. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
During the survey period, disagreements arose regarding waiver
language found in a settlement agreement. In DeRyke v. Teets,"o the
question was whether the former husband, Teets, had an interest in the
former wife's employment benefits plan, including a life insurance
benefit and securities. Five days after the parties' divorce was finalized,
the former wife died intestate. The parties' settlement agreement,
incorporated into their divorce decree, included language wherein each
party waived their interest in the employee benefit plans of the other;
however, the parties were not prohibited from voluntarily providing the
other with benefits."'
After his former wife's death, Teets made a claim for her General
Electric Company employee benefits. While married, the former wife
had identified Teets as a beneficiary and did not remove his name as
beneficiary before her death. A few weeks later, Henry DeRyke, the
former wife's father and estate administrator, applied for the same
benefits." 2 After extensive litigation, the supreme court granted
review."'
The court determined the settlement agreement was an unambiguous
waiver of Teets's interest in the former wife's benefit plan."' It was
noted that the former wife had limited opportunity to make a beneficiary

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 275, 705 S.E.2d at 842.
Id. at 276, 705 S.E.2d at 842.
The husband asserted that the trial court "count[ed] his income twice by awarding

portions of his business in the support awards and again in the property division. . . ." Id.

at 277, 705 S.E.2d at 843.
109. Id. at 277-78, 705 S.E.2d at 843-44 (quoting Steneken v. Steneken, 843 A.2d 344,
351 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)).
110. 288 Ga. 160, 702 S.E.2d 205 (2010).

111.

Id. at 161, 702 S.E.2d at 206.

112.

Id.

113.
114.

Id. at 160, 702 S.E.2d at 206.
Id. at 162-63, 702 S.E.2d at 207.
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change before her death, and speculation of her reason for failure to act
should not substitute for the settlement agreement, which was "concrete
action on the part of the [e]x-[wlife." 1'
16
Similar waiver language was addressed in Alcorn v. Appleton.
The court of appeals held that, where the former wife received the
former husband's ERISA"' benefits in contravention of express waiver
language contained in their settlement agreement, federal law governing
distribution of ERISA benefits did not preclude the decedent's heirs from
bringing a state law breach-of-contract action against the former
wife. 1 8
VIII.

JURISDICTION

Effective July 1, 2010, the Georgia legislature amended provisions of
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91'19 by expanding grounds for exercise of personal
1 20
jurisdiction over nonresidents involved in domestic relations cases.
During the survey period, the Georgia legislature removed some of the
language that was added via the 2010 amendment. 1 2 1
IX.

NOTICE

1 22

In Sherrington v. Holmes, the issue before the court was whether
the mother had proper notice of the father's claim seeking custody
resolution. 123 B.J.S. was born in December 2008, and the biological
father filed an unopposed petition in March 2009, asking the trial court
to legitimate the child, to set his child support obligation, to award him
visitation rights, and to "grant such other and further relief as the court
deemed proper.""' Four days prior to the hearing, the father amended
the petition, requesting that the child have his last name and that the
trial court determine custody.125
At the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the petition
to legitimate, changing the child's last name, and awarding joint legal
115. Id. at 164, 702 S.E.2d at 208.
116. 308 Ga. App. 663, 708 S.E.2d 390 (2011).
117. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
118. 308 Ga. App. at 664-65, 708 S.E.2d at 391-92.
119. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (2007 & Supp. 2011).
120. Id. § 9-10-91(5)-(6).
121. See Ga. S. Bill 139, § 3, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(5)-(6) (Supp.
2011)).
122. 306 Ga. App. 270, 701 S.E.2d 906 (2010).
123. Id. at 270, 701 S.E.2d at 907,
124. Id. at 270, 701 S.E.2d at 906 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 270, 701 S.E.2d at 906-07.
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custody and primary physical custody to the father with visitation to the
mother. On appeal, the mother argued she was entitled to at least
fifteen days notice to respond to the father's custody claim.126 The
father contended that the mother waived her right to notice by not
answering his petition to legitimate and that the language of the original
petition asking for "such other and further relief' raised the issue of
custody.127
The court of appeals held that the general prayer for relief in the
father's petition was insufficient notice that the trial court was being
asked to decide custody in the legitimation action. 128 Further, the
mother's failure to answer the father's original petition did not waive her
right to respond to his later request for a determination of custody. 12 9
Because a party is generally entitled to fifteen days to respond to such
an amendment, the trial court acted prematurely in addressing custody
at the legitimation hearing without giving the mother a reasonable
opportunity to respond to this new prayer for relief.13 o
X.

MODIFICATION OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND DECREE

In Morgan v. Morgan,"a' the supreme court held that the trial court
erroneously modified the parties' final divorce decree.1 32 The decree
provided that, upon the husband's retirement from the Navy, the "[wife]
shall be entitled to receive from his retirement benefits only such portion
of such benefits as the Navy requires be paid to her."133 After the
divorce was final, the parties discovered that the "Navy did not 'require'
any division of [the] [hiusband's benefits and in fact had no legal
authority to determine the allocation of retirement pay between exspouses." 34 Even so, the wife sought the husband's agreement to a
domestic relations order under which the wife would receive 50% of the
marital portion of his military retirement benefits. When the husband
refused, the wife filed a contempt action seeking clarification of her
entitlement to the military survivor benefits or to set aside the divorce
decree based on mutual mistake.13

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 270, 701 S.E.2d at 907.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 271, 701 S.E.2d at 907.
Id.
Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a) (2006) (stating that a party "shall plead within

15 days after service . . .").
131. 288 Ga. 417, 704 S.E.2d 764 (2011).

132. Id. at 419, 704 S.E.2d at 766.
133. Id. at 417, 704 S.E.2d at 765 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id. at 417, 704 S.E.2d at 765-66.
135.

Id. at 417-18, 704 S.E.2d at 766.
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The trial court found there was "a mutual misunderstanding that
Navy regulations defined a former spouse's share of military retirement
pay."136 But rather than set aside the decree, the trial court purported
to exercise its "inherent powers to interpret[,]" determining the parties
had intended to divide the marital portion of the husband's retirement
benefits on an equal basis and awarded the wife 50% of the husband's
retirement benefit accrued during the marriage."3 7 The court held that
in defining a percentage allocation of the husband's retirement benefits,
the trial court went beyond clarifying imprecise language and impermissibly modified the decree.13 1
XI.

APPEAL

During this survey period, the supreme court clarified the issue of
when, after an appeal of a final judgment, a temporary order ends and
a permanent order begins. In Robinson v. Robinson,'" there was a
temporary order regarding child support and alimony, which differed
from the permanent order. 4 0 The supreme court determined that,
because the purposes of temporary and permanent alimony are different,
temporary alimony should continue throughout the contest of the
divorce, and it is at the termination of the litigation that the permanent
award prevails. 41 Thus, temporary alimony continues until entry of
the remittitur in the trial court.142 The court overruled any cases that
have held otherwise.14
In Thompson v. Thompson,'" the supreme court overruled Grissom
v. Grissoml4 5 and reiterated "the long-standing principle that one who
has accepted benefits such as spousal support or equitable division of
property under a divorce decree is estopped from seeking to set aside
that decree without first returning the benefits."' 46 The court made
clear that this ruling does not invalidate the line of cases that hold "a
former spouse may collect an award of child support and still repudiate
a final judgment, as those benefits belong to the child."' 7

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 418, 704 S.E.2d at 766.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 420, 704 S.E.2d at 767.
287 Ga. 842, 700 S.E.2d 548 (2010).
Id. at 842, 700 S.E.2d at 549.
Id. at 846, 700 S.E.2d at 552.
Id. at 846-47, 700 S.E.2d at 552.
Id. at 847, 700 S.E.2d at 552.
288 Ga. 4, 700 S.E.2d 569 (2010).
282 Ga. 267, 647 S.E.2d 1 (2007).
Thompson, 288 Ga. at 5-6, 700 S.E.2d at 570-71.
Id. at 6, 700 S.E.2d at 571.
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Effective July 1, 2011, the Georgia legislature amended provisions of
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34148 and O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35"9 to provide that, where
an appeal involves nonmonetary relief in child custody cases, the
"judgment or order shall stand until reversed or modified [on appeal,]
unless the trial court states otherwise in its judgment or order."150
XII.

ATTORNEY FEES

In Klardie v. Klardie,st at issue was the propriety of awarding
attorney fees based on earning capacity.152 The parties' final divorce
decree imputed $2,000 per month in income to the husband, found the
wife earned $7,093 per month, and, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2,153
awarded attorney fees to the wife."5 The husband contended the trial
court erred in awarding attorney fees to the wife based on earning
capacity. However, the trial court found the husband was underemployed or unemployed by his own doing and clearly capable of earning
more income."'s The supreme court held that "[iun certain domestic
cases, earning capacity is an appropriate means to determine an award
of attorney fees pursuant to [O.C.G.A.] § 19-6-2.")156

148.
149.
150.
2011)).
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (1995 & Supp. 2011).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (1995 & Supp. 2011).
Ga. S. Bill 139, §§ 1-2, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A.
287 Ga. 499, 697 S.E.2d 207 (2010).
Id. at 502-03, 697 S.E.2d at 210.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 (2010).
Klardie, 287 Ga. at 499, 502, 697 S.E.2d at 208, 210.
Id. at 502-03, 697 S.E.2d at 210.
Id. at 503, 697 S.E.2d at 210.

§§ 5-6-34(e), -35(k) (Supp.

